THE NARCISSISM
OF MUSTAFA II (1695-1703):
A PSYCHOHISTORICAL STUDY*

Four days following his accession, i.e., on February 10, 1695, Mustafa II sent an imperial rescript to the incumbent grand vezir, Surmeli Ali, declaring his absolute determination to "... go on the campaign and jihad in person." (kendim binafsihi gitmek uzere ghaza ve jihada kulli niyyet eyledim.) (1) As justification, the new sultan gave the following explanation, "... since my father's sultanate, no ruler has taken to the field of battle in person—thereby the giavors (pagans/Christians) have attacked the Ottoman state from four directions, capturing Muslim lands and taking Muslim prisoners." (2) From the very first few days of his reign, this sultan saw himself as the redeemer of the state, who was bent on reversing the tide of retreat and defeat to one of expansion and victory. The model he set for himself was none other than that of Suleyman I (1522-66), variously called the magnificent and the lawgiver. At no point in his long reign had this sultan, Mustafa II pointed out to his chief executive officer, left the conduct of military campaigns to his subordinates. No, indeed, he made sure that he was always at the head of his army.

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(1) Rashid, Tarih-i Rashid. 6 volumes. (Istanbul, 1282), II, 298-299.
(2) Ibid.
In taking on the military posture and traditions of the glorious past, Mustafa was serving notice on those who opposed his bid to exercise the Ottoman ruler’s prerogative to reign and rule. Specifically, he was challenging the power of an elite which had conducted affairs of state with a minimum of interference from the palace. The pattern was set early in Mehmed IV’s reign when the powers of rule were conceded de facto to Koprulu Mehmed Pasha. From 1656 on, the mode set by this pasha, his family and a coalition of vezirs and pashas who succeeded him, became the norm. These “grandees” managed the state both on the central and provincial levels, at first supplementing the palace graduates, but eventually superseding them in the appointment of their household members to the highest and most lucrative posts of government. By 1695, over half of the appointments to high office were assigned to members of the households of these vezirs and pashas. (1)

Since Mustafa II’s initiative threatened the prerogatives of this elite, the resistance to his martial gesture came from one of their number—Surmeli Ali. This grand vezir was himself a graduate of the household of the late XVI century “grandee” family of the Sokullus. (2) He tried to dissuade his master by first pointing out that the treasury could not afford to mount an imperial campaign at that point since the sultan’s presence would require the traditional extensive and expensive preparations attending his august presence. (3) When Mustafa persisted in his determination by showing willingness to forego all the extra-military expenditures and ceremony, the grand vezir


(3) Silihdar Mehmed Aga, *Nusretname* (Istanbul, 1962-). The unpublished parts of this chronicle were translated into modern Turkish by I. Parmaksızoglu, I, I, 7. Since in the translation there are both distortions and omissions, in my own research I have relied primarily on the manuscript of this chronicle: Istanbul, Beyazit Umumi Kutuphanesi no. 2369. Throughout this study reference is given to both the Parmaksızoglu version and to the original Ottoman Turkish manuscript thus: Silihdar, *Nusretname*, I, I, 7/214a.
incited the military into rebellion. Ali was summarily dismissed and eventually executed. (1) For his replacement Elmas Mehmed was chosen. The latter was a complete palace creature without much experience in war or administration. The highest post which he had occupied before his elevation to the office of grand vezir was that of tevki’i/seal-affixer, nothing more than a ceremonial assignment by the end of the XVII century. (Prior to his elevation to the office of tevki’i, Elmas Mehmed had served in the capacity of an escort to Valide Sultan/Queen Mother on her several journeys between Edirne and Istanbul.) (2)

With the elevation of Mehmed to the highest office in the land, Mustafa II had assured himself of a docile and obedient grand vezir.

By taking these initiatives Mustafa II was not only ignoring the political reality of the by now powerful vezir and pasha households, but also the weakened state of the Ottomans vis-à-vis their Christian competitors in south eastern Europe. Although some territory was retrieved following the disastrous retreat after the failure of Ottoman arms at the gates of Vienna in 1684, contention between the powers had been stalemated. Martial activities were confined to holding actions. By 1695, neither in treasure, men nor equipment was the Ottoman state equal to the combined resources of its enemies. Yet Mustafa chose to ignore the relative weakness of the state in comparison to the European powers. Since he did not have enough time to assess carefully his position with respect to military action, Mustafa must have expected to turn the tide of defeat by some special personal powers.

(1) Ibid., I, I 28, 31/217b. Text authorizing his execution is in Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Muhimme defteri no. 106, 93. Dimitrie Cantemir, a contemporary, explains the antipathy between Mustafa II and this grand vezir in the following manner: "...his only reason for defrauding Mustafa of the throne was, that he feared to lose the absolute power he had enjoyed under Ahmed (II) over the state and the Army, if a prince of vigor and versed in affairs as Mustafa was, should obtain the crown." The history of the growth and decay of the Othman Empire (London, 1756), 396.

(2) For a biography of Elmas Mehmed see Uzunçarşıli, Osmanlı Tarihi, III, 2, 443.
It could be argued that this inflated sense of self-importance is, perhaps the normal posture for a sultan to take late in the XVII century. With this sultan, however, it had gone beyond mere show, for he acted on the assumption that he had unusual capacities to reverse single-handedly the tide of defeat. Having neither specific administrative competence nor any special experience in military affairs, he, nevertheless, and only shortly after his accession, took upon himself the complex task of directing both the internal and external affairs of the state.

That Mustafa was on the right track, Ottoman contemporaries were expected to surmise from two well-timed occurrences. Both merit detailed consideration for the light they shed on Mustafa’s personality.

In mid-April, 1695 (Shaban, 21, 1106), a Christian (Greek Orthodox) priest arrived at Edirne where the sultan held court, to announce that he had a message to deliver to the ruler. (1) When he was admitted before the grand vezir, he related the following: he, the priest, had converted covertly to Islam. One Friday evening while he was secretly performing his prayers he fell asleep. In his sleep he had a dream in which he saw a vision of the Prophet Muhammad and of the late “gazi” sultan Mehmed IV, the incumbent’s father. The Prophet ("who is the pleasure of all created existences") addressed the convert thusly: “Ours is an open (non-esoteric religion) faith, ... Come to it openly (declare your conversion).” The deceased sultan also addressed himself to the priest: “Go ye to my son Mustafa... and declare your Islam to him. You will be superbly rewarded.... Whatever you hear and see here you should convey to him and tell him (on our behalf): ‘Inshalla (God willing) your sultanate will endure for a very long period. With the aid of the Enduring Truth, during your reign many an enemy domain will be conquered and recovered.’ (Mehmed then turned to address the renegado) If the World is to rejoice (in this news), it will be necessary for you to report this message in person to the padishah.” When Mustafa heard the story,

he had the convert brought before him, saw to his needs and ordered that the name "Mehmed" be given to him.

The second occurrence took place early in January, 1696 (Jumadi I, 26, 1107). While preparations for the second campaign were under way, it was reported that the sword which David had used to dispatch Goliath was discovered in the padishah's own treasury. (1) Before coming into the possession of the Ottomans, it was purported to have passed on from ancient times from king to king and prophet to prophet. In its trail, it conveyed success to the efforts of its possessor.

At this juncture, we shall only treat the obvious meaning of these two occurrences, leaving the symbolic and underlying meaning for analysis at an appropriate point in this paper. The timing of the occurrences was not insignificant. Having the concurrent appearance of the Prophet Muhammad and sultan Mehmed with their special messages was obviously meant to convey the impression that Mustafa II was marked for great deeds. This was especially true since Mustafa's sultanate commenced with a blessed event marked by the fall of Chios to Ottoman arms. In historical perspective the prophecy of Mehmed IV was fulfilled with subsequent successes under the leadership of his son. The later appearance of David's invincible sword meant inescapably that Mustafa's second campaign in 1696 would lead to victory. In the first two years of his reign, the Ottoman state, guided by Mustafa's determination, managed to regain some of the land which had been lost to the Christians. It looked as though a blessed and divinely guided sultan had at long last arrived. Surely, the long lost glories of the once "ever-victorious" state would be revived. But the territorial gains and the euphoria of victory ended in 1697 with a humiliating rout and defeat. The firmness and determination which the ruler had displayed in the first two years of his accession gave way in defeat to avoidance and denial of responsibility. This sudden shift in his behavior suggests that underneath the earlier facade of independence and

(1) Ibid., I, I, 133/230b.
determination there was a hollowness. The underlying hollowness and the tendency for indeterminacy were concealed by a concerted effort at image-manipulation.

These observations are based on the assumption that the major extant chronicle contemporary to his reign, contains nearly autobiographical information. The author of that chronicle was instructed to write it at the bidding of the ruler following his accession. (1) (On at least two occasions, Mustafa made direct inquiries about the content of that record.) (2)

The most telling evidence of this sultan’s self-conscious image-manipulation appears in the following reported anecdote. While Mustafa was on his first campaign trail one evening, he ate a course of spinach. Following his dinner, he turned to Silihdar Mehmed, the Chronicler, and asked: “I wonder, o tarihji/historian, does the fact that I am eating spinach (the common soldier’s food) merit entry into the history books?” The Chronicler innocently recorded this royal inquiry in illustration of his master’s sense of humor. (3) This exchange, however, could be interpreted in at least two ways: on the surface, it could be taken as an example of the thriftiness of the ruler and perhaps even his humility, for he was sharing the common soldier’s dinner. Sultans on campaign footing were usually provided with elaborate special menus. But underlying this humility there was vanity, the vanity of a self-conscious exhibitionistic person whose chief preoccupation is himself. The least gesture, here the eating of the common soldier’s food, raised in his own mind the question of whether or not it merited recording in the chronicle. Mustafa’s vanity, furthermore, could not brook any challenges to this projected self-image. As we have already seen, Surmeli Ali, his first grand vezir, paid for his insubordination with his life. Nor could it stand setbacks. On those occasions when his plans and schemes fell short of their mark, or ended in complete failure, he would neither concede defeat nor accept responsi-

(1) Ibid., I, I, 3/214a.
(2) Ibid., I, I, 49/219a, 220a.
(3) Ibid., I, I, 40/219a.
bility for failure. At a later point, it will be shown that instead, he would obfuscate his failures with symbolism and make-believe.

Although the projected self-image and aura of self-confidence were expected to reflect an autonomous personality, neither could hide his need for an external authority and for an alter. The dream of the priest and the sudden appearance of the sword of David suggest Mustafa II’s need for approval and support. Short of having had a vision of God, sanctioning him to act, which would be blasphemous for a Muslim, the sultan had, in the appearance of the Prophet of Islam, the nearest thing to divine approval for which a Muslim could ever hope. Bearing the Prophet’s name, the father, Mehmed IV, acted as an intermediary if not an intermediate source of authority. Mustafa did not only require outside sanction for the projects upon which he was about to embark, but even a sword which would lend magical support to his efforts to implement them.

His need for an actual authority figure becomes apparent from the very first part of Mustafa II’s reign. No sooner had he ascended the throne, than he sent out an invitation to his old mentor, (1) Feyzullah Efendi, to return to Istanbul for eventual appointment to the headship of the religious bureaucracy, the ilmiye.

In a short span of time, this mufti managed to combine the ilmiye office with that of de facto chief executive. (2) The sultan’s dependency on his old tutor can be illustrated by the directive which he had issued in 1703. (3) In all state matters, the sultan ordered his new grand vezir, the chief executive was expected to follow the advice of Feyzullah Efendi. By that


(2) L. V. Thomas points out that Feyzullah combined the two offices of head of the religious bureaucracy and of the government. A Study of Naima (N. Y., 1972, edited from 1947 dissertation by N. Itzkowitz), 84.

(3) Meservey, Feyzullah, 107.
year, Mustafa indicated his incapacity to function without his old mentor when he turned a deaf ear to the outcries against Feyzullah’s flagrant and open violations of the laws and customs which governed both sectors of the government. (1) It took a rebellion in the summer of that year to convince this sultan of the necessity for dismissing his advisor for his corruption and nepotism.

The evidence presented to this point is also suggestive of the personality of someone who was fascinated with himself. One only needs to recall Mustafa’s interest in whether or not his slightest gesture merited recording in the histories. Mustafa was, furthermore, subject to grandiose fantasies upon which he acted unhindered by historical realities. This can especially be seen in the way he acted without regard to contemporary power politics and the military status of the Ottomans in Europe. The deliberateness with which he made his moves can be inferred from the title: Nusretname/Victory Treck, which he chose himself for the chronicle that was kept as a record of his exploits. (2). He coveted for himself the title of world conqueror which rightly belonged to Suleyman I. Mustafa’s unwillingness to modify his grandiosity even in disappointment and defeat is apparent from an examination of Ottoman attitudes toward the preliminaries and the negotiations at Karlowitz following the Ottoman defeat at Zenta in 1697. Throughout, the Ottoman delegation displayed an attitude which could not be construed as anything but that of the victor. (3) The make-believe appears in scattered statements throughout the “report” which was drawn up by the Ottoman delegation at the termination of the congress. Since neither in tone nor in tenor did the report reflect the actual territorial concessions

(1) The violations consisted of placing his several sons and relations in high positions of the ilimiye. In the bureaucracy he managed to dictate not only who became grand vezirs, but also their subordinates. In evidence of his corruption, the anonymous author of “The history of Sultan Suleyman II...” (Berlin Staat-bibliothek, Diez A quart. 75) points out and enumerates the malikaneler (life-long tax farming privileges) assigned to the mufti and his relations (235a-236b).


which had been made by the Ottomans at the peace table it could very easily have been read by the sultan on the one level that showed that neither the ancient principles of perpetual war, which is connoted by the jihad, nor the martial posture of the Ottomans, had been changed in world circles. To the contrary, if he so chose, the reader could see that the Ottomans had reasserted their preeminence even in 1698-99 and had come out of the encounter, at least in their own eyes, undiminished in honor and prestige. At the beginning of the negotiations as at the end, the principle of perpetual hostility was not sacrificed. The formula: "... mutuality and peace, at this point, ... is in meaning the jihad," (i.e., peace is the continuation of war by other means) guided the Ottoman delegation and reflected its government's view of the outcome of the diplomatic confrontation at Karlowitz.

Mustafa's disappointment in the European continent did not bring about a modification in his behavior or initial attitudes. In fact, what we witness is retrenchment and further diffidence which is followed by further reassertion of a martial posture. After 1697, he took up the hunt even more vigorously than he had done up to that point. His physical energies were directed toward reasserting and proving his prowess with the battle moved from the human to the animal world. By 1703, he was ready to plunge the state into yet another military adventure, although he did not participate in it in person. The military arena was moved from Europe to the Caucasus. (In Georgia, Mustafa tried to put to an end a rebellion which had started as an interprincely rivalry between the principles of the Ottoman state's client and tribute states. (1) By the turn of the century, the rebellion turned into an outright defiance of the directives and authority of the Ottomans in the Caucasus. There is evidence to suggest that Mustafa tried to turn some of the tribute-states in that region into direct holdings. (2)

(1) Political conditions in Georgia are detailed in the orders which were issued to Halil Pasha who was appointed commander of the Ottoman expeditionary force. Muhimme defteri no. 144, 50-51.

(2) Ibid. Halil Pasha was instructed to conquer (tamamite zabit) Imeretia, eject its prince and secure and garrison fort Kutais (the capital).
Although one may take this move as an attempt at diverting the attention of the military from the most recent failures, it is also suggestive of an attempt on the part of Mustafa to vindicate his grandiosity, since with the reassertion of Ottoman suzerainty over this region, and its conversion into direct holding, the region south of the Caucasus mountains would be open for settlement by Ottoman Muslim subjects.

The lack of alteration in his view of himself or the state was not confined to martial activities. In 1702 and 1703, while the state was still suffering under the financial strains of the war, evidenced by the inability of the treasury to deliver the full payments which were due to the armed forces and the necessity for demobilization of troops in 1698-1703, the royal house was engaged in ostentatious displays of lavish and extravagant spending for the joint marriages of three princesses royal, all daughters of Mustafa II. (1)

The pattern of behavior which is before us is one of a man who was not only self-confident and exhibitionistic, vain and grandiose, but one whose aura of self-confidence was the major outer manifestation of a hollow, dependent personality. The organizing principle which may illuminate this sultan’s patterns of behavior is drawn from the psychology of narcissism. It is what Heinz Kohut calls injured primary narcissism. (2) With an individual whose personality is focused on its primary narcissism, the driving force is ambition, which aims at actions whose sole purpose is self-gratification. Neither historical reality nor ethical considerations are allowed to intervene in the thrust for fulfillment. Those who, as children, had not had their narcissism tempered by external reality in the form of empathetic frustration incorporate into their own person

(1) The princesses were Safiye, Ayshe and Emine, engaged to be married to Kara Mustafa’s son Gench Ali, his cousin Kopruluzade Numan Pasha, and Chorlulu Ali respectively. The political dimension of the marriage of at least the first two should not escape our attention. Mustafa II, perceiving that the most immediate danger to his throne came from the Koprus, had tried to have two of their sons attached to him in marriage in the vain hope of defusing the discontent which focused on him and on his mentor.

the senses of omniscience and omnipotence which all children at one point in their lives project onto their protecting, nurturing and ever-gratifying parent (usually the mother). Grandiose fantasies and expectations of perfection in people, which would normally have been tempered by childhood, remain active in later years. In the adult phase, these unmodified introjects reappear as ambition for achieving what turns out to be impossible and unrealistic projects, while the perfectability component, on the other hand, is in constant search for the missed person who could live up to the idealized parent. The syndrome which is observable in the behavior of these persons is one of alternation between grandiosity and a sense of shame in failure. Neither shame nor failure, however, is attended by modification in behavior patterns. To the contrary, humiliation in defeat is usually combated by newer projects and schemes which are aimed at the vindication and fulfillment of the fantasies of grandiosity.

The failure to introject empathetic frustration implies unsuccessful incorporation of the ego-ideal. In behavior patterns, this is demonstrated by a flexible conscience which has the tendency to insist on external conformity, on the letter of the law rather than its spirit.

The evidence from Mustafa’s childhood points to an upbringing which could be characterized as free and liberal when compared to the experiences of most other Ottoman princes of the XVII century. By 1664, the year of his birth, his own father Mehmed IV had reigned sixteen years and had twenty-three more to serve. Thus, the son grew up into adulthood unencumbered by the insidious effects of confinement to the kafes/cage which had become the normal lot of all Ottoman princes. Since all living princes of the house were considered heirs-apparent, the practice of confining them to the cage of the harem had been instituted. Those whose fate decreed such confinement for any length of time, especially from childhood on, almost literally rotted. Such was the fate of prince Suleyman who subsequently became sultan (reigned 1687-91). Born in 1642 to sultan Ibrahim, who lost the throne in 1648, he was forty-five years of age when he ascended the throne.
Thirty-nine of those years of his life, for the duration of his brother's reign, he spent closeted in the harem, isolated from contact with the world outside the confines of the inner palace.

After spending nearly four decades of his life in the cage, Suleyman emerged as a total mental and moral incompetent. When an officer came to fetch him in 1687 for enthronement in place of his deposed brother, he refused to be separated from the security of his confinement for fear that Mehmed IV's henchmen would kill him. (1) Despite the assurances of the same officer that indeed there was no such plot to put him away, but that in fact due to the expressed preference of the people for him, the leaders of the state were assembled to declare their allegiance to him as their new ruler, Suleyman responded pathetically: "If it has reached the point of my destruction, tell me, so that I can say my final prayers..." (2) (Ahmed II, Suleyman's successor was not better prepared to ascend the throne; his major claim to fame was that he was skilled in the preparation of the calendar and contemporaries thought of him as pious!) (3) As a leader Suleyman proved himself an utter incompetent. Affairs of state were left completely in the hands of those who managed the dethronement of Mehmed IV and promoted his, and eventually his brother's, succession.

Contemporaries are in agreement that the heir-apparent, prince Mustafa, was indulged if he was not actually spoiled in his childhood. Fazil Mustafa, the second son of Kopru Mehmed Pasha, and not an unbiased observer, thought that the young prince (and his brother Ahmed) was thoroughly spoiled. During the father's reign, princes Mustafa and his younger brother Ahmed, in Fazil Mustafa's words, were "unharnessed. They are said to eat in order to mount (the horse) and they are said to have learned (to play) the tambourine (in order) to drink." (4) Spending their youth in drink, dance and sport,

(2) Ibid., II, 298.
(3) Ibid., II, 569-70.
(4) Ibid.
these princes were not fit to mount the throne. This judgment was meant to be derisive and prejudicial to the claim of the sons of Mehmed IV for the throne in 1687 and 1691. Fazil Mustafa was, after all, in favor of promoting the candidacy of the more docile princes Suleyman and Ahmed, Mehmed IV’s brothers.

The judgment points further to the freedom for development and growth accorded these fortunate princes from the usual stupifying confinement of the harem. (1) (In further substantiation of Fazil Mustafa’s observations on the comparative freedom and indulgence with which Mustafa as prince was treated, the Chronicler Silihdar Mehmed points out that as a young man the prince was allowed to accompany his father both on the hunt and on the campaigns. The joy of Mehmed IV in his first born is attested to by the elaborate and lavish seven days of rejoicing set aside by this sultan upon the birth of his son.) (2)

Whatever evidence we have on prince Mustafa’s parents points to a father who was rather weak and a mother who was preoccupied with herself and her place in the affections of the ruler. Mehmed IV was a mere child when he ascended the throne. During his minority and apparently even in his early adulthood, the Valide Sultan/the Queen Mother exercised the royal prerogatives on behalf of her son. When the Ottoman state seemed threatened with disintegration due to internal turmoil and external invasion, it was she who abdicated power on behalf of her son in favor of Koprulu Mehmed Pasha. The young monarch remained a mere figurehead until 1684. Following the failure of Ottoman arms at the gates of Vienna under the leadership of Kara Mustafa Pasha, sultan Mehmed tried his hand at running the state and proved himself such an utter incompetent that the throne had to be wrested from him before Ottoman fortunes sank even deeper into ruin.

(1) Cantemir also comments on their liberal upbringing, “...these youths (Mustafa and his brother Ahmed) having been liberally educated in the palace, contrary to the custom of the rest of shehzade, and being instructed in the administration of government....”, The history of Ohman Empire, 377.

(2) Richard Knolles (and P. Rycaut), The Turkish History. 3 vols. (London, 1687-1700), II, 151.
Mustafa's mother, on the other hand, was apparently a strong woman who was quite conscious of the precarious nature of her place as the sultan's favorite. According to one European observer, she kept her sultan tantalized and charmed with little demands which she made on him. ("... this lady so corresponded [to the sultan's cares] that she appeared passionately in love, practicing certain pretty tricks of swooning and of an uneasy condition in his absence, which so endeared him in all respects to her, that it was said the sultan kept himself constant to this Queen only....") (1) All the evidence we have on the relationship of Mustafa II with his mother comes from his adult phase. Like most, if not all, Ottoman sultans before and after him, this ruler showed complete deference to his mother even during his sultanate. (The mother, in turn, played not an unimportant role in some of the crucial decisions of his reign. including the elevation of his former tutor to a position of influence, and eventually had a hand in the old mufti's dismissal, when her son could not bring himself to do it. (2) The dismissal of Feyzullah Efendi did not stave off the deposition of her son.)

From the evidence we have explored above, we can only infer that as a child Mustafa must have been indulged. It is not clear whether this indulgence was carried out by the parents directly or through the mediation of royal servants and attendants. The fantasies of grandiosity and omnipotence which he displayed as an adult may be accounted for partially by the attitudes of his parents. Mustafa, however, also showed a great need for his former mentor. Normally this dependence, as we outlined earlier, is the result of a disturbance in the introjection of empathetic frustration. Kohut points out that the effect of the disturbance of the relationship of the child to the parent imago, i.e., the mother, depends upon at which developmental phase the disturbance took place. (3)

(1) Ibid., II, 165.
(2) Anonymous, "History of Sultan Suleyman II" (Berlin, Diez A quart. 75), 243a, 244a.
imbalance occurred very early in the life of the child, the result is usually "a diffuse narcissistic vulnerability." (1) However, if it took place later, but still prior to the oedipal period, "... the disturbance may interfere with the (preoedipal) establishment of the drive-controlling, drive-channeling and drive-neutralizing basic fabric of the psychic structure." (2) In those instances where the disturbance takes place at the oedipal phase, "... then the idealization of the super-ego will be incomplete with the result that the person will forever search for external ideal figures from whom he wants to obtain the approval and leadership which his insufficiently idealized super-ego cannot provide." (3)

The idealization of Feyzullah Efendi, the mentor, by the adult sultan Mustafa II and his need for external sanction implies that as a young child be experienced some traumatic disruption in his relationship to his mother sometime around the ages of five or six, i.e., during the oedipal phase. We can only conjecture about the nature of this disruption. At the age of six, it was the normal practice with young princes to be introduced to the world of learning and men. This marked a stage in their growth and development. It, too, constituted the beginning of their separation from their mothers and women attendants. It is perhaps not insignificant for the development of prince Mustafa's personality that it was at this point in his life that he was first introduced to Feyzullah Efendi, who eventually came to have such a profound influence on his life.

We are suggesting here that the return of the old mentor, Feyzullah Efendi, to a place of prominence at the court of his pupil sultan Mustafa II in 1695, can be accounted for within the psychodynamics of the ruler and his need for an alter due to an incomplete idealization of the super-ego. There are, however, historical factors independent of Mustafa's personal needs which also account and complement the psychological one offered here. Given all the possible talent available to

(1) Ibid., 47
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid., 48-49.
him from among the vezirs, pashas and statesmen of the period, why would the sultan's choice fall on a member of the religious bureaucracy as his top advisor and major counselor. At the outset, it should be pointed out that it was not the usual practice for a ruler to turn to the mufti exclusively for advice in matters of state importance. At the same time, it should be noted that at the highest councils of government this official and other higher ilmiye men were normally consulted in conjunction with men experienced in public affairs. But, here men who were more versed in the day-by-day conduct of government business predominated in numbers and final decisions.

Contemporary sources do not provide any direct explanations for Mustafa's unusual departure in selecting his old mentor. But it may be recalled that when the prince was finally elevated to the throne, it was almost as a last resort, having been passed over twice following his father's deposition. Thus, despite his eligibility, his two uncles were preferred to him. At the time of his accession, Mustafa was the oldest member of the Ottoman dynasty, of sound mind and body, available for the succession. His elevation was more a matter of necessity, i.e., law and tradition, not one of choice or preference. It is quite probable that Mustafa had turned to his old tutor partly due to the suspicions he harbored of the loyalty of those who were in power during the reigns of his two predecessors. Those who had managed to deny Mustafa the throne in 1687 and 1691, and advanced the candidacy of his two uncles instead would have discouraged not only Mustafa, but any prince who had the ambition of regaining control of state affairs.

Feyzullah, the new sultan must have expected, would first and foremost have no political ambition for himself but instead would be completely loyal to his person. A sultan bent on taking the reins of power into his own hands would need such loyalty. Furthermore, this ruler must have been encouraged into believing that he was the chosen leader, surely not by the realistic though perhaps ambitious statesmen of the time. Up to that point the Ottomans had sustained some very serious set backs at the hands of the Christian powers. At best, their advice would have been caution and bracing for defense,
not outright confrontation of the kind which Mustafa envisaged at the outset of the reign. It is perhaps someone with the framework of mind and thinking that Feyzullah had, who would in all probability guide and encourage, no matter how unrealistically, the revival of the old Ottoman ideals and precedents to which Mustafa turned. The revived ideology would spur new initiatives and the conjured historical Ottoman heroes would bolster Mustafa’s bid for control of the state.

As a student, prince Mustafa must have been taught, among other things: both what was expected of him as an heir-apparent, as the future ruler, and was given as examples the exploits of former warrior-sultans (gazis) as historical realizations of the model ruler. Perhaps as a measure of his grandiosity, he took these lessons quite seriously. Early in his reign, however, and unlike Suleyman his great grandfather, Mustafa II insisted upon simplicity of style, foregoing all the luxuries attendant upon a sultan on a campaign footing. To the image of the thrifty warrior, he wanted to add that of the imam, the spiritual and moral leader of his flock who had returned to the occasional practice of dispensing justice in person.\(^1\) If not exactly fanatical, he was like all reformers before him, both puritanical and moralistic, forbidding his soldiers the pleasures of camp followers, be they male or female.\(^2\) In short, Mustafa believed that the Ottoman state needed the right leader, who would cleanse it of corruption and nudge it out of a stagnation which had been its lot since it had changed from the pristine by-gone days of the ancient gazis. Guided by providence, propped by his mentor, this sultan expected to assure the inevitable material and moral recovery of the Sublime Ottoman state.

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(1) Silihdar, Nusratname, I, I, 42/219a.
(2) Ibid., I, II, 146/231b.